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UNILATERAL DISCONTINUANCE OF
CHRISTMAS GIFTS BY MANAGEMENT
Christmas may be a time for giving, but some companies today
are learning their well intentioned company Christmas gift has
boomeranged into a locked-in fringe benefit-at least where the
recipients were members of a collective bargaining unit.
Today no area of truly exclusive management prerogative can
be fenced in. It used to be when an employer enjoyed a good year
and decided to share the Yuletide spirit by giving a Christmas gift to
each employee, both employer and employees accepted that the gift
was discretionary, and, profits being illusive and uncertain at best
when a less profitable year arrived, the employer could at will dis-
continue it. But, today a different interpretation may control, and,
even though restraint and diligence were exercised in granting the
gift, the uninformed employer who discontinues it may find him-
self learning from an Arbitrator or the National Labor Relations
Board that his well intentioned Christmas gratuity has emerged in
new perspective. The gift may now be considered a bonus. Under an
existing benefits clause in his union contract, or interpreted as part
of the wage package or as part of the working conditions of his
employees, the gift probably may not be unilaterally discontinued.
Today it is well recognized that the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts have repeatedly upheld the rights of unions to
include in collective bargaining such fringe benefits as pensions,
group insurance, bonuses, profit sharing plans and stock purchase
plans, as well as the many items commonly embraced by labor con-
tracts, such as union security, wages, incentives, merit increase, sub-
contracting, plant rules, vacations, etc. The only subjects definitely
excluded from bargaining are those deemed illegal from the stand-
point of public policy such as the "closed shop."
In the past a collective bargaining contract between a company
and a union tended to represent all the overt agreements reached by
the parties at the bargaining table. Today the contract may represent
much more. By implication it may also include the disposition of
matters settled at the bargaining table but not included in the
written contract, and may even include implied understandings
not even mentioned at the bargaining table. Therefore, any change
which the employer wants to make in the overall employment rela-
tionship-the package, so to speak-with regard to a matter not
contained in the written contract or discussed at the bargaining table,
may be subject to bargaining. To a great extent this is the viewpoint
increasingly advanced by the Board, and usually enforced by the
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courts. Thus the contract may be said to embrace the total working
relationship existing at the time the contract was signed and con-
tinuing during the life of the contract.
Unilateral action taken by the employer is action taken without
the consent of the union, and, because such action tends to under-
mine a union, it is contrary to the concept of collective bargaining
contained in the National Labor Relations Act.1 As such, a unilateral
act during the term of an existing contract may either violate someprovision of the contract, thus coming within the scope of arbitration
under the grievance clause, or may affect the total working relation-
ship and be regarded as a refusal to bargain and hence an unfairlabor practice within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. However, the mere fact that the action is not provided for
under the written contract, or that it is done without the consent of
the union, does not alone suffice to make it an unfair labor practice.The action taken must be examined with reference to the total work-
ing relationship of the employer and the union.2
Increasingly, arbitrators, the National Labor Relations Board,
and the courts are being called upon to determine whether, under
the facts of the particular case, the employer does in fact have any
right unilaterally to discontinue a Christmas gift. It becomes clear
that the question hinges upon whether the gift is truly a gift, rather
than some form of remuneration or benefit tied to the employment
relationship.
How has the transition of a gift to a bonus come about? A gift
may be defined as "a voluntary transfer of property by one to
another without any consideration or compensation therefor... [it]
must be voluntary, absolute, and without consideration."8 Webster'sprimary definition of a bonus is "something given in addition to
what is ordinarily received by, or strictly due to, the recipient."'
The National Labor Relations Board in the landmark Niles-Bement-
Pond Co.' case, adopted by footnote reference the definition of abonus as "a sum paid for service, or upon a consideration in addi-tion to or in excess of that which would ordinarily be given."'There are discernable factors which contribute to the trans-formation of an intended gift to a vulnerable bonus, but these factors
must be approached with caution and with due regard to the forum
where they will be tested. Generally speaking, arbitrators (with
1 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).2 NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954).
3 24 A.m. JuR. Gifts § 2 (1939).
4 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1940).
5 97 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951), enforced, 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952).6 Id. at 166 n.3.
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important exceptions) have tended to allow an employer more
latitude in unilateral determination of Christmas gifts then has the
National Labor Relations Board. The Board, supported generally
by the courts, has increasingly demonstrated its distrust of unilateral
actions by the employer.
Once management acts unilaterally to discontinue a Christmas
gift the union can either let the act go by or take steps against the
employer. Such steps usually take the form of pressing a grievance,
under the "existing benefits" clause or another catch-all clause,
through to arbitration. Where there is no appropriate clause, the
union can demand that the employer bargain, and if he refuses, file
an unfair labor practice charge with the Board for refusal to bar-
gain under Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.'
As a general rule, the grievance procedure must first be exhausted
before resort can be had to the procedures of the National Labor
Relations Board. However, the NLRB General Counsel has disposed
of some complaints without hearings where the unilateral action
appeared to him not to violate the bargaining agreement.8
The Board today seems inclined to leave the parties to their
contractual remedies when the action taken does not clearly violate
the provisions of the Act. Thus, the Board has dismissed complaints
charging refusal to bargain in Crown Zellerbach Corp.' and United
Telephone Co.'" In the latter case the Board stated:
As the Board has held for many years, with the approval of the
courts: ". . . it will not [serve to] effectuate the statutory policy ...
for the Board to assume the role of policing collective contracts
between employers and labor organizations by attempting to decide
whether disputes as to the meaning and administration of such con-
tracts constitute unfair labor practices under the Act.""
However, an action which violates the written contract may also
7 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958), (making it unlawful to
refuse to bargain on rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment).
8 NLRB General Counsel Administrative Rulings, Cases No. 793 and 843 (1953).
See Case 640, 32 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1953) (Regional Director sustained by General
Counsel in his refusal to issue a complaint against employer where employer refused
to arbitrate discontinuance of a Christmas bonus paid for 20 years. Payments of
$5 to $35 were not in contract or mentioned in negotiations. Six weeks before
Christmas the employer notified union of its intent to discontinue payment of the
bonus because of the depressed condition of the textile industry. The company
was at all times willing to bargain with respect to the issue but refused to submit
it to arbitration. The contract provided for arbitration of unsettled grievances "in
regard to wages, working conditions, or other matters arising out of enforcement
of this agreement or its interpretation").
9 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951).
10 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955).
11 Id. at 781.
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involve violation of the Act, and the National Labor Relations Board
has exclusive jurisdiction to remedy unfair labor practices.
As mentioned before, when a charge concerning refusal to
bargain is filed, it will be under Section 8(a) (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act. This section makes it unlawful to refuse to
bargain on rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment. Both employer and union are required
to bargain in "good faith."12 It should be observed that the statute
provides that neither party is compelled to "agree to a proposal"
nor required to make a concession. 8 In the early and important
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. case,' 4 the Supreme Court
stated: "The Act does not compel agreements between employers
and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever.") 5 A
serious question exists as to the extent to which concessions and
counter-proposals are necessary to good faith bargaining. The Board
repeatedly has tried to make it appear that the employer must yield
on fundamental matters, but the courts have often held otherwise,
denying the Board the right to dictate terms of the agreement. In
NLRB v. American National Insurance Co.,'" the Supreme Court
said: "Congress provided expressly that the Board should not pass
upon the desirability of the substantive terms of labor agreements." 7
In another important case,' 8 the Seventh Circuit Court held that the
obligation of the employer is merely to bargain in good faith, and
that a direction to such effect is not a mandate to pay a pension or
a bonus or whatever other benefit may be in dispute.
Earlier we stated that there were some discernible factors that
have played a part in bringing the unilateral Christmas gift into the
bonus area subject to collective bargaining. Against the foregoing
background of the duty to bargain in good faith these factors may
help to show some of the pitfalls faced by management in unilaterally
ending a Christmas gift.
THE PERIOD OF TIME CHRISTMAS GIFTS ARE CONTINUED
The granting of Christmas gifts to employees regularly over a
long period of time is apparently in itself a factor sufficient to justify
12 Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
13 National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1958).
14 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
15 Id. at 45.
16 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
17 Id. at 408 n.22.




the employees' expectation that they may continue to receive the
gifts as part of their remuneration. Indeed, Arbitrator Jules Justin
in Felsway Shoe Corp.,9 ruled that a gift which had been given to
employees for 10 years or more had become a "fixed financial ar-
rangement" within a contract clause prohibiting any reduction in
wages or other fixed financial arrangements. There is much emphasis
on employee "expectancy" in Board decisions. However, the Board
has not spelled out an answer as to how many Christmas seasons
the employer many give his gift before it becomes part of the
employee's "expectancy," and thus must enter the collective bar-
gaining arena. This confusion is pointed out by Board member
Murdock in his dissent in Niles-Bement-Pond ° wherein he asks:
"Does this [employee expectancy] mean that the first year the
employer gives a Christmas bonus there is no expectancy .... Does
the first bonus provide the necessary expectancy?"'" The majority
of the Board neatly ducked the issue. Arbitrator Francis B.
Delehanty, Jr. in National Distillers Products Corp.,22 stated that he
was "unable to accept the proposition that a wholly gratuitous pay-
ment becomes compulsory, for whatever unlimited time the em-
ployer or its successors continue in business, merely because it is
repeated over a period of years."23 In Tucker Steel Corp.,24 the com-
pany had paid an annual gift equal to one week's pay for the last
five years, and, prior to that, had paid substantial but varying
amounts. There was no mention of the gift in the collective bargain-
ing agreement, nor had the union ever sought to bargain With respect
to the gift. The Board approved the Trial Examiner's ruling that the
company could unilaterally discontinue the gift since the union had
allowed the company to act unilaterally for 12 years without objec-
tion or attempt to negotiate, and by its silence the union became
equitably estopped. The decision held, however, that the company
could not escape its duty to bargain upon request by the union
subsequent to the discontinuance of the gift. The Trial Examiner
specifically said:
The essential ingredient of Respondent's legal unilateral termination
of the bonus in December, 1960, was its reasonable reliance upon a
course of conduct by the union which equitably estopped the latter
regardless of the latter's intent. The foregoing ingredient is not enough
to justify the subsequent refusal to bargain.25
19 17 Lab. Arb. 505 (1951).
20 97 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951).
21 Id. at 171.
22 24 Lab. Arb. 500 (1953).
23 Id. at 512.
24 134 N.L.R.B. 323 (1961).
25 Id. at 333.
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Under similar circumstances, a company which unilaterally granted
a gift was exonerated by the Board of failure to bargain charges.26
Continued payment of a Christmas gift over a period of years
in an unchanging amount without relationship to the company's
varying financial success will tend to cause the gift to be considered
part of the employee's total yearly earnings. Mere automatic
continuation of an established custom is risky to the employer who
considers the gift to be a management prerogative,2 even when the
amount of the bonus is based upon company profits. 29 Where the
gift varied in amount with each employee and differed in amount
from year to year, it was held not an integral part of wages and the
employer could discontinue it at his discretion. But, in Citizens
Hotel Co.,"' the employer had paid a bonus based upon a percentage
of annual income ranging up to sixteen percent in some years for
a period of eighteen years. Ten days after the union was certified as
bargaining agent, and after the union had already submitted a
"maintenance of existing privileges" clause and demanded negotia-
tion, the company announced that it would not pay the bonus and
refused to negotiate the issue. There was also evidence of past anti-
union conduct, and the company was held guilty of violation of
Sections 8(a) (3) and (5) of the Act.82
DIRECT OR INDIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO WAGES PAID
AND/OR LENGTH OF SERVICE
Direct, or even indirect, relationship of the Christmas gift to
wages or length of service will often cause the gift to be treated as
a bonus not economically different from other kinds of remuneration,
such as pensions, retirement plans or group insurance.13 The First
Circuit Court has upheld the Board's contention that the statutory
term "wages" was intended to embrace at least the "economic bene-
fits flowing from the employment relationship." 4 The Board has
26 Texas Foundries Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1642, 1671 (1952).
27 General Telephone Co. of Florida, 144 N.L.R.B. 311 (1963), enforced in part,
337 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1964).
28 American Lubricants Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 946 (1962); Electric Steam Radiator
Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
29 Nash-Finch Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1953), enforcement denied, 211 F.2d
622 (8th Cir. 1954).
80 Renart Sportswear Corp., 6 Lab. Arb. 654 (1947).
31 138 N.L.R.B. 706 (1962).
32 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage
membership in labor unions by discrimination in hiring or in tenure, terms, or condi-
tions of employment).
33 Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951), enforced, 199 F.2d 713
(2d Cir. 1952).
84 W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949).
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also cited the policies of wage regulations under the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950, and Internal Revenue Department decisions to
support its contention that Christmas gifts paid in connection with
the employment relationship are "wages."" On the other hand,
Board member Murdock in his vigorous dissent to Niles-Bement-
Pond, points out that Congress in 1949, in amending the Fair Labor
Standards Act, added Section 7 (d) to the Act, which section excludes
from the regular rate of pay on which overtime must be paid, sums
paid as gifts and payments in the nature of gifts made at Christmas
time or on other special occasiops as a reward for service, the
amounts of which are not measured by or dependent upon hours
worked, production or efficiency.86 In Nazareth Mills, Inc.,87 Arbi-
trator G. Allan Dash, Jr. noted that the Christmas bonus payment
paid for many years was part of the total yearly earnings upon
which subsequent vacation payments were computed. In addition,
the mechanics of the payment caused such benefits to be expected by
the employees as a year-end payment of an exact amount dependent
upon their length of service. For these reasons the bonus had become
an integral part of the wage structure. In American Lubricants Co.,8
a Christmas bonus based upon length of service and amounting to
as much as four weeks' pay had been paid every year between 1948
and 1958. In 1959 the union was certified; the company unilaterally
reduced the bonus paid to bargaining unit employees, and the union
did nothing. In 1960 the union raised the bonus issue during negotia-
tions, but the company resisted, and no contractual provision was
negotiated. Shortly thereafter, the company eliminated the bonus to
bargaining unit employees, and the Board held the company guilty
of refusal to bargain. Arbitrator Ralph E. Kharas in Cortland
Baking Co.,89 ruled that although the Christmas bonus amounts were
historically tied to length of service, because the union contract
contained no reference to them, and prior history indicated the pay-
ments were entirely at management's discretion, the company was
not barred from unilaterally reducing the bonus without consulting
the union despite the fact that the company had successfully argued
during negotiations that it should pay lower wages because other
companies didn't pay Christmas bonusesl The company had also
listed the Christmas bonus along with pension, paid vacations and
other benefits in a circular to employees, and company interviewers
told applicants there was a bonus.40
85 Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 165, 166-67 n.4 (1951).
86 Id. at 170.
87 22 Lab. Arb. 808 (1954).
88 136 N.L.R.B. 946 (1962).
89 25 Lab. Arb. 853 (1955).
40 Compare General Telephone Co. of Florida, 144 N.L.R.B. 311 (1963), en-
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From the foregoing it would appear inadvisable for a manage-
ment desirous of retaining unilateral control over a Christmas gift
in any way to tie or associate it with wage payments, length of
service or any company benefit package, for to do so could well lead
to classification of the gift as an emolument of value accruing to
employees out of their employment relationship-in other words,
"twages."
EFFECT OF PRIOR NEGOTIATIONS
As would be expected, prior negotiation history, whether or not
including specific mention of a Chistmas gift, plays an important
role in determining the status of the gift when considering unilateral
action pertaining to it. Any express waiver of the right to demand
collective bargaining on Christmas gifts will be respected by the
Board, although the waiver must be clear and unmistakable to dis-
charge the statutory duty to bargain.4' Similarly, if the subject
matter of the Christmas gift is brought up specifically during bar-
gaining negotiations and the company indicates the possibility of its
unilateral termination of the gift if the union's other demands are
met, and subsequently the employees, including the union's stewards
are apprised that the gift would be discontinued, and, nevertheless,
the union signs a new contract, the union is estopped from con-
tending that the unilateral termination was a refusal to bargain. 2
Of course, the company is not relieved of its obligation to bargain
in the future should the union wish to discuss a bonus. However,
where a company has given a Christmas gift for many years and
offers to exchange the gift for other benefits during negotiations, the
gift has become a part of the wage package, and the company can-
forced in part, 337 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1964). In this interesting case, the employer
had paid a Christmas gift in a like nominal amount to all employees for a thirty-five
year period (except for three years during the depression). The union had never
specifically discussed the gift in negotiations and it was not covered in the contract.
However, the company had pointed out certain extra benefits, including Christmas
checks, in a special news bulletin entitled "This is Your Extra Paycheck" to all
employees distributed in the midst of its most recent negotiations. In addition, the
company had failed to inform either the union or its employees of its unilateral
decision to drop the Christmas checks when the union by chance learned of the
impending discontinuance and requested discussion of the matter. Interestingly
enough, the union had dropped their existing benefits clause in the same recent
negotiations. The Board modified the Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report and found
the company guilty of an unfair labor practice in "discontinuing the annual
Christmas checks without appropriate notice to, and consultation with, the em-
ployees' certified bargaining representative." The matter "relating as it did to
wages" was held by the Board to be a mandatory bargaining subject. On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit Court affirmed the unfair labor practice, and ordered the company to
bargain with the union over the bonuses in dispute.
41 Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949); Shell Oil Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 161 (1951).
42 Tucker Steel Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 323 (1961).
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not unilaterally discontinue it.48 The importance of prior negotia-
tions upon unilateral action can be illustrated by Nash-Finch Co.,"
in which many employees had individual contracts with the company
which called for annual Christmas bonuses. The company told its
employees that if a union came in, that benefit, along with others
such as hospitalization and group insurance, would probably be
eliminated. Nonetheless, a union was certified, and during negotia-
tions on an existing benefits clause, the union proposed:
The employer agrees that all conditions of employment relating to
wages, hours of work, overtime differentials, and general working
conditions shall be maintained at not less than the highest minimum
standards in effect at the time of the signing of this agreement, and the
conditions of employment shall be improved wherever specific provi-
sions for improvement are made elsewhere in this agreement. 45
The company rejected that proposal and instead, this compromise
wording was agreed upon:
Maintenance of Standards. The employer agrees that wages, hours of
work, overtime differentials, and general working conditions shall be
maintained at not less than the highest minimum standards specified
in this agreement and the conditions of the employment shall be
improved wherever specific provisions for improvement are made
elsewhere in this agreement. 46
After the contract was signed the company unilaterally discontinued
the Christmas bonus for its union employees but not for its other
non-union employees. The Board held that the company had violated
Section 8(a) (5) stating that, while the union might be agreeable to
foregoing the bonus and other benefits, it had not waived its rights
to bargain about them just because it had signed a contract. The
Court of Appeals, however, denied enforcement of the Board's
order, holding that the contract should be taken literally in deter-
mining what the company had agreed to do. The court held that the
union's members already knew the company had no intention to keep
benefits it was not contractually bound to keep; that the changes in
the Maintenance of Standards clause further indicated this, and the
fact that the company continued the Christmas gift to those em-
ployees not covered by the union carried weight. The court felt that
the union had made a-bargain and must be bound by it, and relieved
the company of any duty to maintain the Christmas bonus or even
to bargain about it during the term of the contract. In American
Lava Corp.,47 arbitrated by Joseph M. Klamon, the company had
43 Budd Co. & UAW, Local 813, 61-2 ARB ff 8382 (1961).
44 103 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1953), enforcement denied, 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954).
45 Id. at 1704.
46 Ibid.
47 32 Lab. Arb. 395 (1959).
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obtained specific agreement during negotiations that the Christmas
gift would be excluded from the existing benefits clause. Each year
previously the company had accompanied the gift with a letter
specifically describing it as a "gift" not a part of the employee's
pay, and stating that a similar gift in the future was not guaranteed.
In 1953 the company was purchased by a large national concern,
and during the subsequent negotiations with the union the com-
pany was asked whether the company planned to discontinue the
Christmas bonus. The company negotiator replied, "I don't know
what the Board of Directors will do," and stated further that he
"hoped" the Board would give the bonus the same consideration as
in prior years. Early in December 1953 the company announced
discontinuation of the bonus, and the union filed a grievance which
the company declined to accept. The union went to court to compel
arbitration under the contract, and after several years the United
States District Court ordered arbitration. Each year the union filed
another grievance over subsequent lack of bonuses. In 1959 the
arbitrator held that the company negotiator's words led the em-
ployees into a justified "expectancy" that the bonus would be paid
in 1953 even though it was outside the framework of the contract,
and ruled that the company was equitably estopped from denying
it had an obligation to pay in 1953, but there was no obligation for
subsequent years.
OTHER FACTORS BEARING ON THE DETERMINATION
An unwritten "understanding" that the company would con-
tinue to distribute Christmas turkeys was held not part of the written
labor contract, and therefore not arbitrable where the contract
limited grievance arbitration to contract provisions.48 The union
claimed the turkeys were a fringe benefit and "an indirect form of
remuneration." The company had cancelled the distribution after
nine years allegedly to reduce costs. Ability to pay or the profitability
of the business may be recognized alone in a proper case. The union
usually tries to place the Christmas gift on the plane of a vested
property right on a par with wages due, and the company stresses
that the gift, if not an outright gratuity, is at least a discretionary
payment over and above that which is legally due and should not
be expected in bad financial years. At least one company 49 made its
contention stick that it need only be responsible for payment of a
Christmas bonus in profitable years despite an existing benefits
48 Boeing Co. v. International Union, UAW, 231 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Pa 1964).
49 Dupo Lumber & Hardware Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 518 (1959); accord, Telemetal
Products, Inc., 33 Lab. Arb. 139 (1959).
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clause. The company had paid a month's bonus to each employee
each year, 1937 through 1957. At the time it signed a contract in
1956, it said it would pay a bonus only in profitable years and
insisted that the existing benefits clause be altered to include the
words "in accordance with company policy in the past." In 1957
the company failed to make a profit and accordingly in 1958 paid
no bonus. An arbitrator ruled in the company's favor. Some com-
panies have contractually agreed to pay a Christmas bonus only in
profitable years, and these provisions have been upheld by arbi-
trators.5 ° Another interesting situation occurred in the Rockwell
Spring & Axle Co. case 5' decided by Arbitrator J. Stashower. In
years up to 1956 the company had distributed turkeys at Christmas
to all employees with less than one year of service and a check
to employees with more than a year's service (with certain annual
variations). In 1957 everyone received money. Each year the union
had gone through the ritual of requesting a Christmas bonus pay-
ment, and the request was referred to higher management for deci-
sion. In 1958 the company had an unprofitable year, and the em-
ployees were notified there would be neither a turkey nor money.
The union filed its grievance and the arbitrator found for the com-
pany, ruling that inasmuch as a separate decision was rendered each
year by top management to the union's request, no practice had been
formed ("a practice to be considered a practice binding upon a
party, cannot require a separate decision each year").52
Where anti-union animus is readily evident, the employer will
have a difficult time maintaining a right to unilaterally discontinue
a gift, even where the impact of the act falls equally upon organized
and non-union employees.53 In Toffenetti Restaurant Co.,54 the
employer followed a bonus practice of nineteen years standing. A
union was certified despite a vigorous anti-union campaign by the
employer. During negotiations which followed the company specifi-
cally promised that if any bonus were paid, it would be paid to all.
After the contract was signed the company gave the bonus only to
the non-union employees. The Board found the company guilty
under Sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act.55 Where unilateral
withdrawal of a Christmas gift is coupled with obvious bad faith in
50 See, e.g., Bastian-Morley Co., 3 Lab. Arb. 412 (1946).
51 32 Lab. Arb. 664 (1959).
52 Id. at 667.
53 See Zelrich Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1381 (1963), enforced, 344 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1965).
54 136 N.L.R.B. 1156 (1962).
55 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1958), (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights).
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negotiations56 or reprisals "for voting for the DAMN union 5 7 the
company will certainly be held in violation of the Act.
CONCLUSION
Management rights is a most difficult concept to grasp, and the
term has been much maligned. It is probably true that management
has the duty and the right to manage, but in its application the
concept tends to run into difficulty. Insofar as conduct of the
business is concerned-where to operate, what product, what equip-
menf, methods, etc.-management is usually unchallenged. But,
insofar as the direction of the production force is involved-the
jobs, working conditions, wages, etc.-management legally is limited
and must consider the employees, usually represented by their
union. At the present time "management rights" is subject to
curtailment through the bargaining power of the union. It must be
remembered:
[A] collective bargaining agreement does not necessarily express the
full coverage of employment rights. It covers such matters only as
the parties may have been able to agree upon and leaves unresolved
such issues as the parties may not have been able to agree upon and
with respect to which the law does not require a concession by either
party.58
The right unilaterally to discontinue a Christmas gift is often in this
unresolved area. To determine if the right exists one must consider
not only the terms of the contract but also all aspects of the employ-
ment relationship.
John Baker Weiss
56 E.g., Exchange Parts Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 710 (1963).
57 Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962).
58 United States Steel v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 1956).
